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1 INTRODUCTION
While economists have started opening the black box ‘household’ only recently,
research into intra-household issues has a long-standing tradition in sociology. In
particular, the intra-household distribution of money has received ample attention
in the sociological literature. Various studies – Blood and Wolfe’s ~1960! ‘re-
source theory of family power’ being one of the ﬁrst – suggest a signiﬁcant re-
lation between a household’s ﬁnancial organization and inequalities between part-
ners in decision-making. For instance, Blumstein and Schwartz ~1983! state that
‘... cohabiting women are watchful and independent in ﬁnancial matters, the pos-
sible loss of power being the driving force behind their caution,’ Treas ~1991!
concludes that apart from transaction cost considerations, marital power differen-
tials inﬂuence a couple’s choice between holding joint or separate bank accounts.
Most studies argue that the power balance in a family relates to the comparative
resources like income, education, and occupational status of husband and wife.
Some authors have tested this resource theory, using data from developed as well
as from developing countries; for overviews see Saﬁlios-Rothschild ~1970!, Mc-
Donald ~1980!, and Mizan ~1994!. However, the results of this literature are of-
ten difficult to interpret because of the absence of a coherent analytical frame-
work and a clear deﬁnition of power. We argue that an appropriate way to study
and explicitly deﬁne the distribution of power within households is to analyze
household decision-making within a game-theoretic framework. A bargaining
model of household behaviour allows for the fact that both partners differ in their
preferences towards spending available household income. In that case, the dis-
tribution of power between partners is reﬂected in the extent to which both part-
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© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.ners’ preferences are weighed in the ﬁnal household decisions: the most powerful
spouse will be better able to realize his/her preferences. In section 4 we will fur-
ther discuss our bargaining model.
Although most sociological studies on ﬁnancial management focus on a pos-
sible relation with family power, some of them also point to the burden of man-
aging household ﬁnances. Pahl ~1980! ﬁnds that in low income households, where
ﬁnancial management is more of a chore than a source of power, women typi-
cally manage the household’s money. Alternatively, in high income households
men appear to be more likely to control ﬁnances while their wives receive a
housekeeping allowance. So control over expenditures not necessarily means more
power, but may also stand for the arduous task of making ends meet. This sug-
gests that ~at least! two aspects play a role in the household’s choice how to
divide household ﬁnances between both partners. One is the power aspect, based
on the assumption that the one who controls can inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome. The
other is the efficiency aspect, as the division of ﬁnancial management between
partners may be part of an efficient division of tasks within the household.
In this paper we consider two competing models explaining how ﬁnances are
organized. The ﬁrst model is based on a household production approach, in which
behaviour is determined by an efficient allocation of both partners’ time to mar-
ket work, ﬁnancial management, and leisure ~section 3!. In the second model ﬁ-
nancial management is a reﬂection of bargaining power ~section 4!. As will be
discussed in section 5, the bargaining and the household production approach each
suggest alternative effects of certain household characteristics on ﬁnancial man-
agement within the household. Empirical estimation of these effects may inform
us on which model provides the best interpretation of the ﬁnancial management
of households.
Our empirical analysis uses data from the British Household Panel Survey on
households’ ﬁnancial management and ﬁnancial decision-making ~section 2 de-
scribes the data in detail!. Financial management of households involves a diver-
sity of decisions varying in importance, frequency and amounts of money in-
volved. We analyze information on ﬁve different aspects of ﬁnancial management:
A! the household’s ﬁnancial allocative system; B! who has the ﬁnal say in big
ﬁnancial decisions; C! who pays regular household bills; D! who handles every-
day household spending; and E! do partners ask permission for personal spend-
ings between £10 and £20. These various parts of ﬁnancial management reﬂect
different types of decision-making authority. Vogler and Pahl ~1994! make a dis-
tinction between strategic control and executive management. They suggest that
strategic control concerns important and infrequent decisions with the labour in-
put being small in relation to resulting power. In those cases the power aspect
may very well dominate the efficiency argument. Alternatively, for executive man-
agement, concerning time-consuming and routine-like decisions within certain
limitations, the efficiency argument is probably more persuasive and the house-
hold production approach may be most appropriate. In section 5 we will examine
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argument or the efficiency argument is dominant in the division of responsibili-
ties between partners. Note that we refer to questions A to E as aspects of ‘house-
hold’s ﬁnancial management’. Although several studies interchangeably use terms
like ‘decision-making power,’ ‘authority,’ ‘responsibility,’ and ‘management,’ we
chose to use the last term as we think it is the most neutral term.
2 DATA: THE BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY1
In the British Household Panel Survey ~1991–1992! couples were asked to point
out which ﬁnancial allocative system they use to organise their ﬁnancial affairs.
The question was formulated as follows ~Taylor ~1992!!:
People organise their household ﬁnances in different ways. Which of the methods
on this card comes closest to the way you organise yours? It doesn’t have to ﬁt
exactly – just choose the nearest one. You can just tell me which letter applies.
A I look after all the household money except my partner’s personal money
B My partner looks after all the household’s money except my personal spend-
ing money
C I am given a housekeeping allowance. My partner looks after the rest of the
money
D My partner is given a housekeeping allowance. I look after the rest of the
money
E We share and manage our household ﬁnances jointly
F We keep our ﬁnances completely separate
G Some other arrangement
The question was answered by both partners separately. We selected a subsample
of couples of which we had the answers of both partners and additional informa-
tion on education, current income, etc. Table 1 shows the answers of both part-
ners, with HFAS denoting the ﬁnancial allocative system reported by the husband
and WFAS the allocative system reported by the wife. We excluded categories F
and G from our table, as these were chosen by only a few couples and because
they raised some interpretation difficulties. The codes of HFAS and WFAS are
deﬁned as follows:
1 Wife is given a household allowance
2 Husband looks after all household money, except wife’s personal spending
money
1 The data were made available through the ESRC Data Archive. The data were originally collected
by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change at the University of Essex. Neither the origi-
nal collectors of the data nor the Archive bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations
presented here.
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4 Wife looks after all household money, except husband’s personal spending
money
5 Husband is given a household allowance
In our opinion this ordering of the codes reﬂects a higher inﬂuence of the wife in
higher codes: while the third system is associated with joint management, the
ﬁrst two are ‘male managed,’ and the last two ‘female managed’ systems. One
could argue, however, that the order of 1 and 2 is unclear and perhaps should be
reserved, as well as the order of 4 and 5. But since the second and the fourth
system explicitly exclude the partner’s personal spending money from the house-
hold money looked after, we associate these with a more equal distribution of
inﬂuence over partners than the ﬁrst and ﬁfth system. We will come back to this
in section 5, but meanwhile we will assume that the ﬁnancial allocative systems
can be arranged as above.
Table 1 shows that in roughly two-thirds of the cases both partners agree on
which ﬁnancial allocative system they use ~diagonal cells!. We see that more than
half of all respondents ~1475 males and 1454 females! report to manage house-
hold ﬁnances jointly, over a quarter reports that the wife looks after all house-
hold money, and the housekeeping allowance system and ‘husband looks after all
the money’ are each reported by about 10 percent of all respondents. These ﬁg-
ures correspond very well with a study by Vogler and Pahl ~1994!, who found
percentages of respectively 50, 26, 12 and 10 using the same categories of al-
locative systems. However, their ﬁndings were based on a dataset in which only
one spouse per household was interviewed ~the British ‘Social Change and Eco-
nomic Life Initiative,’ 1987!.







123 45 T o t .
1 170 28 33 13 3 247
2 64 154 79 15 1 313
3 80 81 1138 174 2 1475
4 24 10 202 524 3 763
54 1 2 4 2 1 3
Tot. 342 274 1454 730 11 2811
348 S. DOBBELSTEEN AND P. KOOREMANIf both partners give non-corresponding answers, mostly one of them reports
equal sharing of ﬁnances ~the highest off-diagonal numbers are found either in
the third row or in the third column!. Also note that on average respondents
ascribe less responsibility to themselves than their partners do: husbands more
often choose higher categories than their wives. Consider, for instance, the column
and row corresponding with allocation type 3: given that their partners chose this
type, 204 husbands versus 176 wives chose a category with less male responsi-
bility, while 112 husbands versus 161 wives chose a category with less female
responsibility. The same holds for the other management types.
Why do partners provide different answers? A priori several explanations for
the discrepancies can be hypothesized. A ﬁrst hypothesis is that the question asked
may be ambiguous to respondents. ‘Managing household ﬁnances’ may cover
various domains of ﬁnancial decision-making and at each domain both partners
can play a different role. So depending on how respondents weigh the various
components of ‘managing household ﬁnances’ they will choose the best ﬁtting
category. In this case, partners may perfectly agree on who is responsible for
various parts of household ﬁnances but still report different types of allocative
systems. Another explanation of the observed discrepancies may be that respon-
dents are simply not aware of their authority. Olson and Rabunsky ~1972! ﬁnd
that respondents can better identify what decisions are made than who makes
them. Mizan ~1994! reviews some studies on discrepancies between self-report
and observation. Feminist research has argued that men and women’s experiences
may lead them to perceive the world differently ~Harding ~1986!!. Furthermore,
respondents may be reluctant to admit or deny any authority over their partner
~e.g. Turk and Bell ~1972!, Antonides and Hagenaars ~1992!!. This last sugges-
tion would especially explain the large number of respondents in our sample re-
porting equal sharing of household ﬁnances. We will test a number of these hypo-
theses on our data.
Tables 2 up to 5 shows the responses to questions B, C, D and E, respec-
tively. The percentages of corresponding answers for B, C, and D are much higher
than for question A: 75 for B, 82 for C, and 85 for D. As suggested above, this
is likely to be related to the fact that question A is deﬁned less narrowly than the
other questions. Note that for question E respondents are only asked if they them-
selves ask permission for personal expenditures between £10 and £20, and not if
their partners ask them for permission. Therefore, we cannot check if the answers
of both partners correspond with each other for question E.
Note that the questions concern various types of decision-making authority,
varying from strategic control to executive management.





Wife Husband Both Other Total
Wife 111 63 101 275
Husband 21 421 208 2 652
Both 93 240 1540 4 1877
Other 2 1 2 5
Total 225 726 1850 8 2809
T A B L E3–C !IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO MAKES SURE THAT REGULAR HOUSEHOLD





Wife Husband Both Other Total
Wife 1127 74 122 6 1329
Husband 32 873 76 4 985
Both 72 123 276 4 475
Other 2 2 1 11 16
Total 1233 1072 475 25 2805
T A B L E4–D !AND WHO IS MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING YOUR EVERYDAY
HOUSEHOLD SPENDING? I MEAN THINGS LIKE FOOD, HOUSEHOLD NECESSITIES AND




Wife Husband Both Other Total
Wife 2010 53 163 2226
Husband 36 120 36 192
Both 84 46 257 387
Other 1 1 2
Total 2131 219 456 1 2807
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In this section we interpret the management of household ﬁnances as a speciﬁc
form of household production. Starting point is that all parts of ﬁnancial man-
agement, varying from daily shopping to taking out a mortgage, cost time. We
consider both partners’ time inputs as the only characteristic of the household’s
ﬁnancial management, so possible power aspects are ignored in this section. We
assume the amount of home production ~i.e. managing household ﬁnances, other
forms of household production are ignored! to be exogenous, but the time inputs
of both partners used to realize it can be chosen by the household. Note that this
assumption distinguishes our approach from traditional analyses of household pro-
duction, in which the household can choose the desired amount of home produc-
tion as well. This distinction results from the nature of home production consid-
ered: while most examples in literature deﬁne home production to include
cooking, cleaning, child care, and other services for which market alternatives
may or may not be available, we limit our analysis to ﬁnancial management.
The amount of home production resulting from the time inputs of both part-
ners is described by a household production function:
Z5z~Hm, Hf!~ 1 !
where Hm and Hf denote the time inputs of the male and the female partner,
respectively. The optimal allocation of both partners’ time to home production
and other activities results from the household maximizing its utility subject to
certain time and budget constraints and the home production function. We as-
sume that the two-adult household has the following ~joint! utility function:
U5u~X, Lm, Lf!~ 2 !
where X is the amount of consumption goods, and Lm and Lf are hours of leisure
enjoyed by the male and female partner, respectively. Note that we assume that
T A B L E5–E !IF YOU BUY SOMETHING FOR YOURSELF COSTING BETWEEN £10 AND
£20 WOULD YOU USUALLY: ASK YOUR PARTNER IF YOU COULD BUY IT; MENTION IT




Ask Tell No mention Other Total
Ask 156 211 47 5 419
Tell 204 1026 220 32 1482
No mention 74 402 352 14 842
Other 8 16 10 6 40
Total 442 1655 629 57 2783
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production does not enter the utility function. However, we assume that the ex-
istence of the household requires a certain ‘amount’ of ﬁnancial management Z u,
such that z~Hm, Hf!5Z u. If we specify Z as:
Z5a ? Hm1b ? Hf , ~3!
the time input of the husband can be substituted by the time input of the wife at
a constant rate a/b. This speciﬁcation in most cases will lead to corner solutions,
i.e. only one partner wil participate in home production, while in our data we
observe both partners participating in ﬁnancial management very frequently. We
therefore chose a more general speciﬁcation, in which corner solutions are less
prevalent. We assume the production function z to be concave, so z is increasing
in both its arguments, and the matrix of second derivatives is negative semi-deﬁ-
nite, with Hm and Hf substitutable at diminishing marginal rates.
Let T be the total time endowment of each partner in a household. Each part-
ner’s time can be allocated to leisure ~Lp!, home production ~Hp!, or working in
a paid job ~Np!, so the following time constraint must hold:
Lp1Np1Hp5T , p5m, f . ~4!
Moreover, the household is restricted to the household’s budget constraint:
X5m1wm ? Nm5wf ? Nf ~5!
where m is the household’s non-labour income, and wp is the net wage rate of
partner p.
The household maximizes its joint utility function ~2! subject to the restric-
tions given by ~4! and ~5!, the household production function ~1!, and non-nega-
tivity constraints on X, Lp, Hp and Np, where p5m, f. We assume that the non-
negativity constraints on Lp are not binding in an optimal allocation, so both
partners have a positive amount of leisure. From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of














Alternatively, if inequality holds in equation ~6! it is optimal that only one of
both partners handles ﬁnancial management.
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ners’ time inputs in the home production function. If we choose speciﬁcation ~2!,
the substitutability will be constant ~namely a/b! for all values of Hm and Hf.
The isoquants for this case are presented in Figure 1a.
Figure 1a – Isoquants for home production function Z5a ? Hm1b ? Hf
Figure 1b – Isoquants for concave home production function z~Hm, Hf!
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stance, w9 m/w9 f in Figure 1a, it is optimal for the ﬁnancial management to be
handled by one partner. Only when wm/wf exactly equals a/b it does not matter
which partner handles ﬁnancial management. However, we assumed the produc-
tion function z~Hm, Hf! to be concave, in which case both partners’ time inputs
are substitutable at diminishing marginal rates. Figure 1b shows that in this case
corner solutions are likely to occur less frequently.
We are particularly interested in how the optimal distribution of home produc-
tion over both partners relates to both their wages. So, we are interested in
whether the functions hm and hf given by
Hm *5hm~wm, wf! , Hf *5hf~wm, wf!~ 8 !
are increasing, decreasing or constant in both partners’ wage rates.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case that in the household’s optimal time allocation
~Lm *, Lf *, Nm *, Nf *, Hm *, Hf *! both partners participate in the labour force and in
home production, so that ~7! holds. We know that the amount of home produc-
tion only depends on Hm and Hf. Now what will happen if wm increases? To
restore equality in ~7!~ ­ z / ­ H m ! / ~ ­ z / ­ H f !must increase as well. Figure 1.b shows
that the household can achieve this by decreasing Hm in favour of Hf. Similarly,
if the wife’s wage increases, the household will increase Hm at the expense of
Hf.
Let us brieﬂy examine what happens in case only one of both partners handles
ﬁnancial management ~we still assume that both have a paid job!. First suppose








In this case an increase in wm/wf will affect ~Hm *, Hf *! only if the increase is high
enough to change the inequality sign in ~9! into an equality. The household will
then substitute units Hm by Hf until either the marginal rate of substitution equals
the wage ratio, or the maximum amount of the female’s time needed for home
production is reached. So in correspondence with the case of an interior solution
discussed above, a ~large enough! rise in wm/wf will cause a fall in Hm * and a rise
in Hf *. A decrease in wm/wf will have no effect on ~Hm *, Hf *!, as the inequality in
~9! will still hold: the male will keep providing the maximal amount of his time
needed for home production. The case where only the wife participates in home
production is analyzed analogously.
Finally, let us brieﬂy mention the relationship between wm/wf and ~Hm, Hf! in
case at least one of both partners does not have a paid job. In these cases we
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we do know that it is lower than the household’s marginal utility of p’s leisure
time. Depending on the household’s production function and the marginal utili-
ties of both partners’ leisure time, the household ﬁnances are managed by one or
by both partners. It can be shown that an increase in the wage of one of both
partners will either decrease this partner’s share in home production, or will have
no effect at all on the distribution of home production between partners. So over-
all we again expect to ﬁnd a negative relationship between wm/wf and Hm.
So far we have not discussed any variables other than wages that can inﬂu-
ence both partners’ optimal time inputs in ﬁnancial management. In addition to
this we assume an individual’s productivity in ﬁnancial management to increase
with his/her level of education, so the male’s share in managing household ﬁ-
nances will increase with his own education level, and decrease with the female’s
education level.
The main conclusion of this section is that the household production model
shows a negative relationship between a partner’s wage rate and his participation
in ﬁnancial management. Figure 2 shows how Hm * and Hf * can relate to wm/wf
when the wife is more productive in home production than the husband. In sec-
tion 5 we will empirically investigate if the suggested relationships between wm/wf
and Hm and Hf hold.
Figure 2 – Possible relationship between Hm * and wm/wf and between Hf * and wm/wf when the wife is
more productive in home production than the husband
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In the previous section we assumed that both partners’ time inputs into ﬁnancial
management result from an efficient distribution of labour within the household.
Alternatively, we will now focus exclusively on possible power aspects of the
ﬁnancial management of households. In sociological literature several authors
have suggested that patterns of ﬁnancial management within the household reﬂect
the division of power in decision-making between partners ~e.g. Blumberg ~1991!,
Blumstein and Schwartz ~1983!, Hertz ~1992!, Vogler and Pahl ~1994!, and Wil-
son ~1987!!. Unfortunately, most of these papers do not clearly deﬁne what is
meant by marital power. To explicitly deﬁne the division of power between part-
ners we analyze household decision-making in a bargaining framework.
A bargaining model of household behaviour allows both partners to have dif-
ferent utility functions, so their preferences may differ. We denote the utility func-
tions of both partners by Um~X, Lm, Lf! and Uf~X, Lm, Lf!, respectively.2 In case
of egoistic agents, the leisure of one spouse does not directly affect the utility of
the other spouse, so the utility functions reduce to U
i~X, Li!, i5m, f. We assume
that if partners choose to behave noncooperatively, each will maximize his or her
own utility function given the behaviour of his/her partner, yielding a Nash equi-
librium. We also assume that in this case there is no pooling of resources and no
joint consumption. The corresponding utility levels for husband and wife are de-
noted by CN
m and CN
f , respectively. These noncooperative outcomes depend on
both partners’ wages and nonlabour income.
Alternatively, partners can behave cooperatively by making agreements. As the
partner who would lose the most in case of disagreement is more likely to make
concessions, the utility levels in the noncooperative outcome can be interpreted
as ‘threat points’ in the bargaining process. The partners will therefore choose an
allocation from the set of Pareto-optimal allocations of the household. In particu-
lar, we consider the cooperative Nash bargaining solution; see e.g. McElroy







f ~wm, wf, a!%
~12l! , ~10!
subject to budget and time constraints. Here a denotes all variables ~apart from
wages! that determine the noncooperative outcomes for both partners, like non-
2 X, Lm and Lf have the same meaning as in the previous section; X is the amount of consumption
goods, and Lm and Lf are hours of leisure enjoyed by the male and female partner, respectively.
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higher a spouse’s threat point utility level, the stronger the relative bargaining
power of the spouse will be in the sense that the solution will be more favour-
able for that spouse.
If patterns of ﬁnancial management reﬂect the division of power in decision-
making between partners, we would expect to ﬁnd a relationship between the
participation in ﬁnancial management of both partners and their relative bargain-
ing power. A possible explanation for such a relation is that if a partner has a
larger share in the management of household ﬁnances, this person can inﬂuence
household decisions in favour of his/her own utility function.4 If both partners
know that this is the case, their participation in the household’s ﬁnancial man-
agement will exactly correspond with their bargaining power. The larger a part-
ner’s relative power, the larger will be his/her share in the management of house-
hold ﬁnances.
As shown by McElroy ~1990! a rise in the wage wi increases his/her threat
point utility level CN
i and, as a consequence, the outcome of the maximization of
~10!. Thus a rise in the male’s wage rate increases his relative bargaining power,
which will raise his share in household ﬁnancial management. Alternatively, an
increase in the wife’s wage rate will cause a positive ~bargaining! effect on her
share of household ﬁnances. So in contrast with our results in the previous sec-
tion, in the bargaining framework the wage rate of a partner has a positive effect
on his/her participation in ﬁnancial management.
5 TESTING THE HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODEL VERSUS THE BARGAINING MODEL
Both the household production model and the bargaining model can be used to
explain the ﬁnancial management of households theoretically. The previous sec-
tions show that a crucial difference between both approaches is the expected in-
ﬂuence of both partners’ wage rates. While the household production model pre-
dicts a negative relationship between an individual’s wage and his/her share in
ﬁnancial management, the bargaining model implies a positive relationship. This
difference between both models forms the basis of our empirical analysis.
3 McElroy ~1990! mentions various so-called extrahousehold environmental parameters ~EEPs! that
may shift the threat points in Nash bargaining models of household demand but do not affect prices
and nonwage incomes faced by married individuals. Examples are measures of competitiveness in the
marriage market, parents’ wealth, additional nonwage income received in the form of welfare when
unmarried, and tax changes due to leaving a marriage.
4 For instance, Gray ~1979! found that husbands who handed over their entire wage to their wives
were less likely to work overtime than husbands who gave their wives a ﬁxed housekeeping allow-
ance. In the latter case husbands often regard extra earnings as personal spending money and so had
a greater incentive to do overtime.
357 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, BARGAINING AND EFFICIENCYTo investigate how the ﬁnancial management of households relates to various
household characteristics we will estimate an ordered probit model for each of
the ﬁve different aspects of household ﬁnances: A! the household’s ﬁnancial al-
locative system; B! the ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions; C! payment of regular
household bills; D! handling of everyday household spending; and E! permission
for personal expenditures between £10 and £20. As noted before, each aspect is
likely to reﬂect a different level of decision-making authority. A priori, in accor-
dance with Vogler and Pahl ~1994!, we expect that ‘handling everyday household
spending’ and ‘taking care of regular household bills’ are examples of executive
management, i.e. unimportant and time-consuming decisions within limitations.
For these parts the efficiency argument seems to be more persuasive than the
power argument, so they probably best ﬁt the household production model. Al-
ternatively, we expect that ‘having a ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions’ and ‘ask-
ing permission for small personal expenditures’ involve strategic control. Conse-
quently, they may better ﬁt the bargaining model. We do not postulate any
expectations with respect to ‘the household’s ﬁnancial allocative system’ since it
is likely to reﬂect both efficiency and power considerations. The empirical results
may give us some hints on whether we should interpret the various parts of ﬁ-
nancial management in terms of marital power or as the result of an efficient
division of duties within the household.
We will now elaborate on how to apply the two models to parts A to E of
ﬁnancial management and how to deﬁne the dependent variables in the ordered
probit equations. In the analysis of parts A to D we only use observations for
which both partners have chosen the same answer categories. For part E, how-
ever, we only have the answers of one partner available.
The central explanatory variables in our estimations are both partners’ wage
rates and their education levels. Other possibly inﬂuential variables we will con-
sider are the number of children present, importance of religion, and the amount
of nonlabour income of the household. These variables were not mentioned in
the previous sections as they play no particular role in the distinction between
the household production and the bargaining interpretation of ﬁnancial manage-
ment. We have chosen not to include hours of work or wage income ~deﬁned as
hours of work times the wage rate!. Note that both theoretical models generate a
relationship between ﬁnancial management and exogenous variables ~such as
wages!, and a relationship between hours of work and exogenous variables. Here
we only estimate the former.
Estimation of the model requires information on both partners’ ~potential! wage
rates, also of individuals who do not report to have a job in the survey. We there-
fore ﬁrst estimate a wage equation for males and females separately, based on
the individuals for which we do have wage rates. Using these equations we cal-
culate predicted values of wage rates for individuals in our sample that do not
358 S. DOBBELSTEEN AND P. KOOREMANparticipate in the labour force. For all other individuals we use observed wage
rates in our estimations.5
A! Financial allocative system
The question asked to respondents was ~slightly reformulated!:
‘Which of the following methods comes closest to the way your household ﬁ-
nances are organised?’
1! Female partner is given a housekeeping allowance
2! Male partner looks after all household money, except wife’s personal money
3! Both share and manage household ﬁnances jointly
4! Female partner looks after all household money, except husband’s personal
money
Other answering categories are excluded in this analysis. Note that the ﬁnancial
management methods reﬂect different structures of the individual sub-budget con-
straints.
The interpretation of the four answer categories and their ranking may be dif-
ferent in the bargaining framework than in the household production approach. In
terms of marital power we would order the four systems as indicated above, re-
ﬂecting an increasing inﬂuence of the wife going from answer category 1 to 4.
6
In order to test if the bargaining approach can explain the allocative system used
by the household we estimate an ordered probit model based on these four answer
categories. In the household production model only the time inputs of both part-
ners matter. In that case the ‘household allowance’ system ~answer category 1! is
somewhat difficult to interpret, as both partners spend some time on managing
household ﬁnances but each operates at his/her own level of authority. As we do
not want to aggregate this category with answer category 3 ~shared manage-
ment!, we leave it out of our analysis so that three categories remain: 2, 3, and 4.
We analyze the household’s choice by estimating an ordered probit equation with
the dependent variable being deﬁned by:
5 We use age, age squared and four dummy variables for level of education as explanatory varia-
bles. The resulting wage equations are ~t-values in parentheses!:
wm50.2110.18age20.002age210.87e111.64e213.42e313.38e4
~0.21!~ 3.84!~ 2 3.22!~ 4.30!~ 7.34!~ 10.55!~ 12.07!
wf 51.3010.09age20.001age210.60e110.84e212.89e312.65e4
~1.90!~ 2.82!~ 2 2.34!~ 4.53!~ 4.63!~ 12.01!~ 12.78!
with R2s of 0.11 and 0.16, respectively. These equations are estimated by OLS. In principle, one
should correct for the selection bias caused by only using participating individuals in the estimation
of the wage equation. However, Heckman’s two-step procedure gives poor results for the males and
the implied estimate of r lies outside the ~21.1! range. For the females the procedure offers no prob-
lem, but the selection bias has no signiﬁcant effect in the wage equation.
6 One could argue that the mutual ordering of 1 and 2 is unclear and perhaps should be reversed.
But since the second category explicitly excludes the wife’s personal spending money from the house-
hold money looked after, we associate it with a more equal distribution of power between partners
than the ﬁrst category. Below we will test the ordering of allocative systems empirically.
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15Both share household ﬁnances ~1055 obs!
25Wife looks after all household ﬁnances ~491 obs!
The empirical results for question A are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 6.
The estimated coefficients show that a lower male wage rate results in a higher
share of the female in the management of household ﬁnances, which supports the
bargaining model. The female’s share is also increased by a lower education level
of the male and a lower household nonlabour income. An alternative model in
which the order of ‘wife is given an allowance’ and ‘husband looks after’ were
reversed could not be estimated.7 This ﬁnding conﬁrms our assumption that the
household allocative systems should be ordered as suggested above.
We also ﬁnd that a higher nonlabour income increases the male’s share and
decreases the female’s share in the management of household ﬁnances. This ap-
pears to be similar to Pahl’s ~1980! ﬁnding that in high income households men
are more likely to control ﬁnances ~while their wives receive a housekeeping al-
lowance! than in low income households. However, in contrast with Pahl the re-
sult does not concern total income but only nonlabour income, so wage incomes
of both partners do not account for the effect. Furthermore, the probability of
‘wife looks after’ increases with the number of children, and decreases with the
educational level of her partner. The latter effect can be explained within the
household production context when the male’s productivity in ﬁnancial manage-
ment increases with his education level.
7 The estimation algorithm stops as the calculated ordered probit constants turn out not to obey the
required order.



















constant 1 1.679 ~12.7! 1.148 ~8.8! 0.843 ~6.6! 1.713 ~12.0!
constant 2 1.964 ~39.3! 2.464 ~45.1! 0.329 ~17.1! 0.100 ~1.3!
ln~wm! 20.160 ~22.5! 20.177 ~22.8! 20.257 ~24.4! 20.033 ~20.3!
ln~wf! 0.139 ~1.6! 0.009 ~0.1! 0.153 ~1.9! 20.066 ~22.1!
education male 20.123 ~24.1! 20.051 ~21.7! 20.154 ~26.0! 20.098 ~22.8!
education female 20.014 ~20.4! 0.110 ~3.3! 0.041 ~1.5! 0.135 ~4.4!
[ children 0.039 ~1.4! 20.092 ~23.3! 0.032 ~1.2! 20.025 ~3.7!
nonlabour income 20.032 ~24.9! 0.000 ~0.0! 20.057 ~27.9! 0.045 ~0.6!
religion important 0.033 ~0.5! 20.123 ~21.8! 20.126 ~22.0! 0.663 ~16.3!
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The dependent variable is in this case deﬁned by:
~B! 05Husband has ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions ~394 obs!
15Both have ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions ~1432 obs!
25Wife has ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions ~106 obs!
An interpretation of these answer categories in the bargaining framework is
straightforward: the power of the female partner increases with higher answer
codes. An interpretation in terms of time inputs involved is less trivial; the time
spent on the ﬁnal say may be small in comparison with the search for informa-
tion preceding the ﬁnal say, and possibly these two stages concern different part-
ners. However, we assume that if a partner has the ﬁnal say, he or she is the only
person spending time on making the ﬁnal decision. Note that in our probit equa-
tions only differences in time inputs between the various answer categories mat-
ter, the exact assumption of time spent on an activity is not important.
The second column of Table 6 presents the ordered probit estimation results
for question B. The signs of the wage coefficients point to the bargaining model,
although ln~wf! is not signiﬁcant. A higher education level of the female in-
creases the probability that she has the ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions. Alter-
natively, a larger number of children increases the probability that the husband
has the ﬁnal say. The latter result may also point at the bargaining model; Ott
~1992! argues, considering fertility as a prisoner’s dilemma, that childbearing de-
creases the bargaining position of the wife. We also ﬁnd that importance of reli-
gion signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of the wife having the ﬁnal say.
C! Regular household bills
The dependent variable is in this case deﬁned by:
~C! 05Husband takes care of regular household bills ~813 obs!
15Both take care of regular household bills ~260 obs!
25Wife takes care of regular household bills ~1051 obs!
This question is also expected to concern executive management. Regular house-
hold bills are mostly taken care of by only one partner: in 49 percent of house-
holds the wife takes care of them, and in 38 percent of households the husband
does. The interpretation of the answers in terms of time inputs and power is simi-
lar to that of the previous question: in category 2 both the time input and the
share in family power of the female partner is higher than in category 0.
The fourth column of Table 6 shows that the signs of the coefficients for both
partners’ wage rates correspond with the bargaining interpretation: a rise in a part-
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household bills. This contradicts our suggestion ~and Vogler and Pahl’s! that this
aspect of ﬁnancial management reﬂects executive management and should have
little to do with power. Apparently, the labour intensity of paying regular house-
hold bills is small in relation to power gains associated with it.
The share of the husband in taking care of regular household bills also in-
creases with his level of education, the amount of nonlabour income, and the
importance of religion. The number of children seems to slightly increase the
probability that the wife takes care of regular household bills.
D! Everyday household spending
The dependent variable is in this case deﬁned by:
~D! 05Husband handles everyday household spending ~111 obs!
15Both handle everyday household spending ~241 obs!
25Wife handles everyday household spending ~1865 obs!
This question is expected to concern executive management. In 84 percent of
households the wife exclusively handles everyday household spending, while for
the husband this is the case in only 5 percent of the households. Deriving the
time inputs of partners is again not straightforward because of the use of the
word ‘mainly’ ~see section 2!. We assume, however, that if one partner is mainly
responsible he or she spends more time on everyday household spending than the
other partner. Our interpretation of the answer categories in terms of power is
that power rises with a higher involvement of a partner. So in category 2 both
the time input and the share in family power of the female partner is higher than
in category 0. The third column of Table 6 shows the estimation results.
The signs of the wage rates correspond with the household production ap-
proach, although the estimated coefficient for ln~wm! is not signiﬁcant. A larger
number of children and a lower nonlabour income increase the probability that
the wife handles everyday household spending and decrease the probability that
the husband handles everyday household spending. Moreover, a lower educa-
tional level for both partners increases the probability of the wife handling
everyday household spending on her own. Overall, the results provide weak evi-
dence in favour of the household production model.
E! Permission for personal expenditures
Our analysis of this aspect of ﬁnancial management is somewhat different from
the rest. In the ﬁrst place, a household production interpretation does not seem
plausible as no time inputs are involved in this question. We therefore concen-
trate exclusively on possible power aspects to the extent in which partners feel
362 S. DOBBELSTEEN AND P. KOOREMANinclined to ask permission for personal spending. Secondly, in categories A to D
we have answers of both partners at our disposal, and we only select observa-
tions for which both partners provide the same answer. Recall, however, that in
category E respondents are only asked if they themselves ask permission for per-
sonal expenditures between £10 and £20, and not if their partners ask them for
permission so that we cannot check if the answers of both partners correspond
with each other.
We will start our analysis by examining both partners’ answers separately. We
estimate ordered probit equations on the following dummy variables, reﬂecting
the answers provided by wives ~E1! and husbands ~E2!, respectively.
~E1! 05Wife reports that she asks permission ~382 obs!
15Wife reports that she only tells partner ~1357 obs!
25Wife reports that she does not mention it ~767 obs!
~E2! 05Husband reports that he asks permission ~400 obs!
15Husband reports that he only tells partner ~1539 obs!
25Husband reports that he does not mention it ~567 obs!
A majority of respondents only tells his of her partner about personal expendi-
tures between £10 and £20: 54 percent of wives and 61 percent of husbands.
Moreover, 15 percent of wives and 16 percent of husbands say they ask their
partner for permission. However, it is not clear if this information can be inter-
preted in terms of power. The extent to which partners ask permission may be
mainly determined by the total amount of household income available: a very
low household income may require more control by both partners than an abun-
dant household income. If this is the case, each partner’s answer on asking per-
mission may be more related to ﬁnancial means than to power. Alternatively, it
may be informative to examine differences in the responses of partners. Irrespec-
tive of the amount of household income, one partner may feel more inclined to
ask permission than the other. To investigate this we create a new variable E3,
which is deﬁned as follows
8:
~E3! 05Wife gives more account to husband than vice versa ~442 obs!
15Wife and husband chose the same answer category ~1429 obs!
25Wife gives less account to husband than vice versa ~635 obs!
This variable may reﬂect several differences between partners to the extent in
which they feel free to use household income for personal expenditures. In 18 per-
8 The value of E3 follows from the difference between the values of E1 and E2:
If: E1,E2, then E3 equals 0;
E15E2, then E3 equals 1;
E1.E2, then E3 equals 2.
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while in 25 percent of the households the opposite holds. Estimating an ordered
probit on E3 may inform us on what variables inﬂuence these differences be-
tween partners.
The results of all three ordered probits are presented in Table 7. The ﬁrst col-
umn shows that the wife is less likely to ask permission for personal expendi-
tures if both her own and her partner’s wage rate increases, and if the number of
children is smaller. This may conﬁrm our suggestion that asking permission has
more to do with lower ﬁnancial means and ‘making ends meet’ than with power.
We also ﬁnd that wives with higher educational levels feel less inclined to ask
permission. The second column shows that the husband is less likely to ask per-
mission if his own wage rate increases and if he has a smaller number of chil-
dren; his partner’s wage rate has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence. A rise in his partner’s
education level, however, makes him less likely to ask permission. Both results
are a bit difficult to interpret in terms of power.
The variable analyzed in the third column may be more related to power. We
ﬁnd that a higher value of the wife’s wage rate results in a higher value of E3.
So wives with a higher wage rate are more likely to give less account to their
husbands than their husbands to them. This suggests that the extent to which part-
ners feel free to spend household income on personal expenditures increases with
the amount of money brought in by themselves. This supports the bargaining
model, in which the access of both partners to common household income de-
pends on their wage rates. Further note that only the wife’s wage rate is signi-
ﬁcant. Perhaps, her contribution to the household’s income is more important in
this respect than the traditionally ‘taken for granted’ contribution of the male.
TABLE 7 – PROBIT ANALYSES OF ASKING PERMISSION FOR PERSONAL SPENDING
~t-VALUES IN PARENTHESES!
Variables E1 E2 E3
constant 0.427 ~4.0! 0.536 ~5.3! 0.751 ~7.0!
ln~wm! 0.197 ~3.9! 0.283 ~5.9! 20.068 ~21.3!
ln~wf! 0.290 ~4.0! 0.051 ~0.8! 0.222 ~3.3!
education male 0.010 ~0.4! 20.001 ~20.1! 0.019 ~0.9!
education female 0.066 ~2.5! 0.054 ~2.1! 0.017 ~0.7!
[ children 20.090 ~24.2! 20.042 ~22.0! 20.037 ~21.8!
nonlabour income 20.009 ~21.5! 20.004 ~20.7! 20.003 ~20.6!
religion important 20.082 ~21.5! 20.091 ~21.6! 0.011 ~0.2!
mu~1! 1.572 ~44.3! 1.775 ~48.5! 1.602 ~46.4!
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In this paper we have investigated what determines a household’s choice of ﬁ-
nancial management. We have estimated two competing models explaining how
ﬁnances are organized: a household production model and a bargaining model. In
the ﬁrst model behaviour is determined by an efficient allocation of both part-
ners’ time to market work, ﬁnancial management, and leisure, whereas in the sec-
ond model ﬁnancial management is a reﬂection of bargaining power.
The empirical results show that the household production model does not very
well in explaining various management systems: only for aspect D ~everyday
household spending! we ﬁnd coefficients with signs corresponding with this
model, but not all coefficients are signiﬁcantly different from zero. Apparently,
this aspect of ﬁnancial management is mainly a form of executive management,
with the possible power gains being small in relation to the labour input in-
volved. For all other parts the estimated effects of wage rates point at the bar-
gaining interpretation. Even for ‘who makes sure regular household bills are
paid?’ power aspects appear to dominate efficiency considerations. We also ﬁnd,
in accordance with earlier results by Pahl, that the participation of wives in ﬁ-
nancial management is higher in low income households than in high income
households. For future research, it would be interesting to further investigate if
efficiency aspects play a larger role in low income households than in high in-
come households. In future work we also plan to include employment ~rather than
wage! as an explanatory variable. However, since employment is endogenous and
may be both a consequence and a source of marital power, such an extension is
not a straightforward exercise.
One possible caveat in the interpretation of our results should be mentioned.
To the extent that wage is a better proxy of a person’s ability to perform tasks in
ﬁnancial management than education, a positive relation between involvement in
ﬁnancial management and wage may after all be a reﬂection of efficiency rather
than of power.
We have considered the two alternative models separately. Probably, both ef-
ﬁciency and power aspects play a role simultaneously. The opposite wage effects
will then cancel out to some extent. For instance, the insigniﬁcant male wage
coefficients for aspect D may be caused by opposite bargaining and efficiency
effects of equal magnitude. Alternatively, the bargaining effects found for aspects
A, B, C, and E do not exclude that efficiency considerations also apply, albeit to
a smaller extent.
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Summary
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, BARGAINING AND EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD;
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This paper analyzes data from the British Household Panel Survey on households’ ﬁnancial manage-
ment and ﬁnancial decision-making. Direct subjective information was collected by asking questions
like ‘Who has the ﬁnal say in big ﬁnancial decisions?’. All questions were answered separately by
both partners. We consider two competing models explaining how ﬁnances are organized. The ﬁrst
model is based on a household production approach, in which behaviour is determined by an efficient
allocation of both partners’ time to market work, ﬁnancial management, and leisure. In the second
model, which is game-theoretic in nature, ﬁnancial management is a reﬂection of bargaining power.
The two models have different implications for the effect of explanatory variables, in particular wages,
on the dependent variables. Empirical results indicate that ﬁnancial management is primarily deter-
mined by bargaining considerations.
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